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Introduction
From 1830 to 1854, the Indian policy of the United States called for
the establishment of a permanent Indian frontier west of the organized
States and Territories. The Proclamation Line of 1763 set a precedent
for this when King George III attempted to keep the American colonists
east of the Appalachian Mountains. The United States Army occupied many
forts along the frontier line, among them Fort Scott in present-day
southeastern Kansas. Some of the posts, such as Fort Snelling in the
north and Fort Leavenworth, were built prior to the establishment of the
Indian frontier, but the army constructed Fort Scott solely to maintain
the white-red boundary.
The Removal Act of 1830 embodied the concept of the permanent Indian
frontier. It provided for an exchange of Indian lands east of the
Mississippi River, where the white population was increasing rapidly, for
land west of the Mississippi. The United States government did not
expect these land exchanges to be accomplished in a short time. In 1830,
the Rocky Mountains formed the western boundary of undisputed United
States territory; it was into this trans-Mississippi West that the
Indians were moved. In 1834 Congress passed the Intercourse Act which
increased the penalties for those who would violate the integrity of the
permanent Indian frontier or attempt to sell whiskey or hunt on Indian
lands. The 1830s saw the policy of Indian removal progress toward a
true permanent Indian frontier, beyond which no white settlement could
exist under the law. Despite legislation from Washington, D.C., however,
the Indian country and frontier never achieved the permanence envisioned
for them.
The goal of a permanent Indian frontier held its greatest popularity
in the years immediately prior to the Mexican-American War. By about
1840, most of the tribes that had agreed to move had indeed done so, and
the expansionists' dream of a nation stretching from coast to coast had
not yet captured the imagination of officials. Even at that point,
however, pioneers filtered into the Indian lands, forcing the government
to negotiate new treaties with the tribes for more land cessions. White
settlement in Missouri and then Arkansas and Iowa pushed the remaining
Indians out of those areas.
Indian removal beyond the Mississippi stemmed from more than the
white man's desire for more farmland. If land-hunger had been the only
factor, there would have been no efforts to make the frontier permanent.
Rather, the Indian frontier was an attempt by officials to preserve the
Indians as a race working with the desires of the frontiersmen for cheap
land. Initially, tribes moved west seeking game to support their
traditional way of life which had been severely altered by the influx of
settlers. As time progressed, however, concerned whites began to feel
genuine fear for the survival of the Indians because of the loss of their
ancestral lands and their weakness for alcohol. Indian numbers were
decreasing and tribal members were not being absorbed by the white
population. The only way for the Native Americans to survive was
adaptation to the white man's ways—specifically, to change from
predominantly hunting and gathering societies to societies based on
3agriculture. This great change, they felt, could be accomplished only if
the Indians were isolated from the negative influences of white culture,
such as alcohol.
The projected transition for the Indians required time, space, and
dedicated men. Missionaries and Indian agents working beyond the
permanent Indian frontier were to accomplish the feat of civilizing the
Indians. Men such as Jotham Meeker and Isaac McCoy struggled to bring
Christianity to the Indians while training them for a new way of life.
They firmly believed that once the Indians learned how to manage farms
and desired to follow the paths of agriculture and Christianity to
civilization, the government would be able to cease its paternal care of
the tribes.
Agents and sub-agents of the Office of Indian Affairs also had great
responsibilities and, as a rule, were uincere in their dealings with the
various Indian bands. They negotiated treaties, mediated conflicts
between tribes, and disbursed the annuities paid to the Indians. Their
letters and reports from the period express extreme frustration over
their inability to effectively curtail the whiskey trade.
Even as the government established the frontier and attempted to
make the boundaries clear, changes occurred which drastically altered
Indian policy. The concept of the permanent Indian frontier disappeared
between 1848 and 1854, but the reasons for its demise appeared long
before then.
Ever greater numbers of settlers moved west along the trails in what
became Kansas and Nebraska during the 1830s and 1840s. The Santa Fe
Trail, in use since 1821, carried traders between the western United
States and Mexico regularly until the railroads spanned this distance.
4These merchants steadily increased their commerce until the war with
Mexico when the United States acquired what is today the states of
California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. As United States
territory, the route picked up even more traffic which further increased
with the California gold rush of 1849. The Oregon Trail also led many
travelers west, both to Oregon and later California. Though the number of
pioneers remained relatively small until the United States and Britain
settled their dispute over the control of Oregon in 1846, traffic increased
steadily throughout the early 1840s. As the number of emigrants increased,
so did their cries for protection against marauding Indians. More troops
moved west to protect the wagon trains, encouraging more pioneers to go
to the Pacific coast and take advantage of the protection afforded them.
This inertia soon contributed to plans to open a broad transportation
corridor and thus clear the central section of the Indian country of
Native Americans.
The revised Indian policy of the early 1850s—concentration in small
reservations
—
paved the way for white settlement in the present states of
Kansas and Nebraska. Though first mentioned by officials in the early
1840s, concentration of the Indians was not executed for about ten years.
This policy crowded the Indians onto reservations much smaller than they
had originally been given, into spaces that offered them no choice in
their way of life. They could only support themselves by farming, which,
it was argued, was in the Indians' best interests. This change in policy
was embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 which gave territorial
status to the central section of the Indian country.
Fort Scott in southeastern Kansas illustrated the actions and forces
on the Indian frontier in the 1840s. The government authorized its
5construction in 1842 just when the bulk of the tribes were supposed to be
settled indefinitely. Though other posts guarded the Indian country,
they were not necessarily built as permanent installations expressly to
maintain the frontier. The army built Fort Scott between Forts Gibson
and Leavenworth in order to fill the defensive gap and abandoned the
post only when it became apparent that Kansas would be incorporated as a
territory of the United States and the Indians of the area moved to new
locations. The occupation of Fort Scott from 1842 to 1853 depended on
the policy of maintaining the permanent Indian frontier.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ORIGINS OF THE PERMANENT INDIAN FRONTIER
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Chapter One
The Origins of the Permanent Indian Frontier
The policy of Indian removal had its roots in the European theories
of Indian land ownership and occupation developed during the early
explorations of the New World. The European concept centered on the
right of preemption, which gave the first white settlers the opportunity
to acquire and occupy Indian lands. This understanding among the
colonial powers developed over a long period and did not take into con-
sideration the views of the Indian inhabitants. Originally, clear title
to the land became official only after the natives "sold" it or after
their conquest, but eventually mere claims of absolute sovereignty by the
imperialist nations sufficed. If Indians contested land ownership by
force, they lost to the superior firepower of the colonists.
The original British-American colonies, and later the United States,
inherited or assumed the rights of the mother country. The Indians owned
the land, but if they should become extinct, voluntarily leave or sell
2
the land, only the United States could claim ownership. Land speculators
and frontier settlers supported these theories because they resulted in
the availability of more land at better prices.
The philosophy of land ownership had evolved by 1830 as the nation
10
grew in population and power. Not only could Indians voluntarily give up
their land, but land could also be denied to them because the tribes
claimed far more than those in control of the nation judged that they
needed. The prevailing white bias favored agriculture over hunting, and
so a tribe's hunting lands could be broken up into parcels of farm land.
Indians would be paid for their land, including compensation for any
improvements, and thus everyone was to be satisfied. The alternative to
3
this involved taking the desired territory "by the sword." This change
in the appropriation of tribal lands resulted from the compromise between
the desire for justice and the land-hunger of the frontier settlers.
Attempts were made to erect a large-scale boundary between white
settlement and Indian country, but all divisions remained temporary. The
governor of Pennsylvania had concluded a treaty in 1758, which not only
solidified a white-red border, but even returned lands that had been
purchased from the Indians four years earlier. This had set a precedent
for the Proclamation of 1763, when British king George III decreed that
the region beyond the Appalachians belonged to and could only be occupied
4
by Indians. Neither of these attempts at segregation had enjoyed much
success.
Thomas Jefferson is generally credited with having developed the
concept of Indian removal as distinct from an Indian country in situ. The
Louisiana Purchase of 1803 gave the United States more land than President
Jefferson envisioned needing for many years, so he concluded that the new
land would be an ideal place in which to place the Indians. Immediate
removal and that which followed later resulted in an exchange of land east
of the Mississippi River for generous tracts west of the Mississippi; it
was not simply a matter of taking the land away from the Indians.
11
The policy of Indian removal progressed slowly at first, but
accelerated under subsequent administrations. As early as 1793, some
members of the Delaware and Shawnee tribes had moved into Spain's
Louisiana territory. The Spaniards readily accepted them in an effort to
create a buffer zone between Spanish settlements and the United States.
Some Cherokees went west to hunt before the War of 1812, and by 1816
there were about 2,000 of the tribe living in what is now Arkansas. Not
until 1817, though, did the United States negotiate a formal exchange of
lands with the Cherokee Indians. The treaty did not dispose of all
Cherokee lands in the southeastern United States where problems between
the Cherokees and state governments continued.
In the mid-1820s, changing circumstances lent urgency to Indian
removal. The plantation system spread through the Gulf plains during this
period, creating a demand for the land on which the southern tribes
resided. In addition, white settlers in the Old Northwest crowding the
Indians prompted Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in January 1825 to urge
the removal of virtually all Indians living east of the Mississippi.
Calhoun recommended that two regions be set aside for the Indians. The
northern tribes, a smaller group, were to be moved to the present state of
Wisconsin, while the southern tribes were to be sent west of Missouri and
Arkansas Territory. Many of those removed to the area of Wisconsin even-
tually went to the Kansas and Nebraska region under an extension of the
removal policy.
In order to make room for the emigrating Indians in the West, the
United States concluded treaties with the native Kansa and Osage tribes.
General William Clark, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St. Louis,
negotiated these treaties, promising the protection of the United States
12
from their traditional enemies. The Plains tribes gave up claims to land
in Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Kansas, but still retained large tracts
Q
in Kansas. The lands given up by the Kansas and Osages opened up a tremen-
dous amount of territory onto which the eastern Indians would be placed.
The process of Indian removal continued at about the same pace until
1829 when Andrew Jackson took office as President. In recent years, the
popular conception of Andrew Jackson as the Indian-hating president has
q
been revised. Though Jackson had frequent contacts with Indians during
his career as a military leader, not all of the contacts came on the
battlefield. He gladly used Indians as allies and "personally liked and
respected individual Indian chiefs." His main concern was for the
security of the United States. In order to assure that security and the
Indians' survival, he felt that the Native Americans had to adopt the
c .j . ., . . 11
ways of white civilization.
By the time of the Jackson administration, major difficulties had
arisen between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Georgia. These
differences predated Jackson's presidency, but it was Andrew Jackson who
ultimately settled them. He believed that the Indian nations were not
absolutely sovereign, even on the lands guaranteed them by treaty.
Congressional or state actions applied to all residents of the United
States, regardless of their racial origin. Earlier interaction, accord-
ing to Jackson, had been based on the weakness of the United States and
its desire to cease or prevent hostilities at any cost. That position of
12
weakness no longer existed for the country by 1829.
The Cherokee Nation had embraced "civilization" as much as any tribe
in the United States. The Cherokees had developed an agricultural
economy, as opposed to the hunting culture of most other tribes, and
13
their politicians had enacted laws based on those of white society. They
clung to their ancestral lands, and though some Cherokees had emigrated
westward, the great majority of the tribe preferred to remain in the
southeast.
Most Cherokees lived in the State of Georgia, and Georgia was
anxious to be rid of them. An 1802 agreement between Georgia and the
United States stipulated that the Federal government would peacefully
remove the Cherokees as soon as possible. However, the Cherokees did not
wish to move and white Georgians became impatient. The discovery of gold
on Cherokee land added to the Georgians' anxiousness. In 1827, relations
between the Cherokees and the whites grew worse after the tribe adopted a
constitution asserting complete sovereignty within the Cherokee lands.
In December 1828, the Georgia state legislature passed a bill which
extended Georgia laws to cover all Indian residents of the state. Among
these laws was one which prohibited Indians from testifying in any trial
involving a white man, an indication of how the citizens of the state
treated Indians. Into this struggle stepped Andrew Jackson. He would
not aid the Cherokees, supporting the doctrine of states' rights, and
presented as alternatives to the Indians the options of staying in
Georgia and submitting to harsh state legislation or moving west where
14
they would have to deal only with the Federal government. Jackson used
fear, which he considered an excellent weapon against the Indians to get
them to move. Though it would be years before the Cherokee removal was
finished, they had lost their legal struggle to remain in their tribal
homeland and eventually migrated west along the "Trail of Tears."
Removal advocates needed funds before they could carry out their
plans. The Removal Act of 1830 provided the initial money and authority.
14
Despite widespread support for the bill, a hard- fought battle preceded
its passage. Jeremiah Evarts, a talented lawyer and editor, guided this
opposition to the Removal Bill.
Evarts actively promoted missionary work in the 1820s. He has great
faith in America's ability to fulfill his dreams "of a world fully
evangelized, [and] of universal conversion to Christ." Because of
Evart's concern for the Indians and the respect that others had for him,
Thomas L. McKenney, head of the Indian Office in Washington, D.C.
solicited his support for Indian removal as early as March 1827. Evarts
refused and soon came out against the concept.
Evarts focused his opposition to Indian removal on the Cherokee
Nation in Georgia, but he applied it to all of the eastern Indians.
Using the pseudonym "William Penn," Evarts wrote a series of essays in
which he presented both legal and moral arguments on behalf of the
Indians. His primary question was, "Have the Indian tribes , . . . , a
permanent title to the territory, which they inherited from their
fathers, which they have neither forfeited nor sold, and which they now
„ r .
•. ,,18
occupy ? [sxcj
.
Evarts believed there was no question regarding the Cherokees' legal
right to their lands. Quoting from treaties made with the Indians, he
called attention to the frequent use of the word "guaranty" in them.
"The power and good faith of the United States" assured enforcement of
the treaties, Evarts stated, so the government needed to honor the treaty
provisions to maintain its dignity. Evarts also appealed to his country-
men's sense of national honor in stating his case for the Indians. He
warned against succumbing to the "plenitude of our power, and
. . . pride
19
of our superiority. He implied that although the American people had
15
not yet been guilty of condoning any " systematic legislation ," they would
be held ultimately responsible for allowing the passage of removal
legislation. Finally, Evarts appealed to the belief and faith in "The
Great Arbiter of Nations." God would not tolerate any "injustice
20
perpetrated against the weak, by the strong." Though Jeremiah Evarts
was not alone in his views, he was the most outspoken of those who
opposed the removal policy.
Many of those in favor of removal were also, like Evarts, genuinely
concerned for the survival of the red man. Thomas McKenney, who had
tried to gain Evarts' support in promoting removal, had long been
considered a friend of the Indian. General William Clark, the former
explorer and contemporary Superintendent of Indian Affairs at St.
Louis, also supported removal, believing that the Indians were generally
suffering from the adverse effects of white social habits and that their
only way to survive was to get them away from the whites. Isaac McCoy,
a frontier Baptist missionary who, for a time, had great influence in
Washington, D.C., joined McKenney and Clark in their efforts to preserve
the Natives.
Policymakers in the 1820s were confronted with several possible
alternatives. Annihilation of the Indians as a race and as individuals
comprised the first of these and there were probably many people who
considered this a feasible option. The Indians also, theoretically, could
have been absorbed by the overpowering white culture which surrounded
them, but few Indians wanted to lose their tribal identity. The course
of action, advocated by men like Evarts, would have allowed the Indians
to remain in the east under the protection of the Army. The Army in the
1830s, however, lacked sufficient manpower for such action, and Congress
16
would not have authorized the increase necessary to guard the tribal
reserves against white squatters. Removal beyond the line of white
21
settlement seemed to those in power to be the best solution.
Isaac McCoy, a Baptist missionary who had spent many years among the
Indians, recognized only two options for the tribes: removal or extinc-
tion. He felt that in the struggle between whites and Indians, the
Indians always lost their lands, thus McCoy's goal centered on the
establishment of a permanent Indian country where the Indians would have
the time and distance from white civilization necessary to adapt and
22
conform to the changing world.
McCoy was not only a missionary, but a frontiersman. He spent most
of his life on the fringe of settlement or in the Indian country itself
founding missions and preaching to the Indians. Traveling frequently,
McCoy led surveying expeditions into what was to be the Indians'
permanent homeland and made several trips to Washington to consult with
23
officials and to testify at hearings. Despite his best intentions, he
held an ethnocentric view, assuming, as others did, that the Indians
really wanted to adopt the white man's culture.*
In May 1830, Congress finally passed the Removal Act by a slim
margin. The measure allowed the president to declare certain lands west
of the Mississippi permanent Indian lands and to exchange those areas for
the Indians' holdings east of the Mississippi. Thus, it replaced the
patch-work machinery used earlier with a single law that allowed the
president to extinguish Indian land titles without the formal application
*This becomes apparent after reading several of the Annual Reports of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Congressional serials of the 1830s
and 1840s.
17
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or every settlement interested in doing so. Though the Removal Act was
presented as being in the best interests of the Indians, the Congressional
action implied the use of force if necessary. Congress authorized funding
to aid voluntary removal westward, but willingly or not, the Indians
25
would have to move. But while the 1830 bill was a sweeping measure and
provided adequate money to begin implementing the policy, the formation
of the permanent Indian frontier required more than a single act of
Congress.
Several additional measures had to be enacted in order to make the
permanent Indian frontier really operable. One goal, backed by such
people as McCoy but never achieved, was the establishment of an organized
Indian Territory with a representative in Congress. Proponents attempted
to push this through Congress unsuccessfully in 1834, but they lacked even
the support of the Indians themselves
.
Two other measures affecting Indian affairs did, however, make it
through Congress in 1834. A reorganization of the Indian Department
under the Secretary of War increased the efficiency with which Indian
matters were dealt. Indian Office agents gained greater security in
their positions, and the accounting methods used in the disbursement of
annuities were made more efficient, eliminating much "confusion and
27
embarrassment." Congress also passed the Intercourse Act of 1834 which
actually did as much to establish the permanent Indian frontier as the
Removal Act of 1830. This legislation improved upon similar laws dating
back to 1790, which were designed to govern Indian-white relations and
set up guidelines for all contact between the two cultures. The act
also increased the penalties for infractions such as selling liquor to
the Indians and hunting or trapping in Indian country. Finally, it
18
denied entry into the Indian lands to all white men except those traders
and missionaries who possessed the proper licenses. Agents and subagents
could appeal to the military to remove trespassers who violated the law
28
and intruded in the area reserved for the Indians.
Together with the Removal Act of 1830, the Intercourse Act of 1834
laid the foundation for the permanent Indian frontier. It took several
years of treaty negotiations with various Indian tribes before the con-
cept even began to be implemented, but by 1834, the policy which governed
Indian affairs for the next twenty years was formed and waiting to be
implemented. Though the policy did not work as planned in civilizing the
Indians behind an impressive long-term barrier, the concept of the
permanent Indian frontier did represent an attempt to deal with the
Indians in a way that was mutually beneficial to all concerned.
The garrison at Fort Scott enforced the Indian policy as well as it
could in the years 1842-1853. Despite selecting the best site possible
to influence the Indians and their white neighbors in Missouri, the Army
could not prevent contacts between the two races. White influence
intruded into the Indian territory throughout the period in which Fort
Scott was to enforce segregation so the civilization of the Indians could
not proceed unhampered as planned.
19
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CHAPTER TWO
CIVILIZING THE INDIANS
Chapter Two
Civilizing the Indians
By the time that the Intercourse Act of 1834 became law, the policy
of establishing a permanent Indian frontier had been accepted by
officials as being both possible and desirable. The ultimate goals of
this policy included much more than just moving the Indians out of the way
of white expansion. Certainly many individuals cared only that good
farmland be cleared of those who were not making efficient use of it, but
many others felt that the Native Americans risked extinction from contact
with white society and wished to assure their survival. The only way to
do that, they felt, was to isolate the Indians until they could adapt to
an agricultural lifestyle and become like white men.
As early as 1790, the intercourse acts established annual funds to
be used in helping the Indians change their ways of life. The government
made plows and looms available hoping that the Indians would realize the
advantages in abandoning hunting as a means of survival. Some treaties
between the United States and Indian tribes also provided for blacksmiths
and carpenters to live near the Indians in order to help them make tools
and build homes.
Thomas Jefferson saw the desirability of convincing the Indians to
22
23
change. He was convinced that raising crops and livestock meant an
easier life and less land needed for them. With that in mind, he urged
the establishment of government trading houses that would demonstrate to
2
the Indians the quality and availability of manufactured goods. Always
present in this concern for the well-being of the tribes was his belief
that once the Indians did accept an agricultural life, they would roam
less, change their values, and require much less land to support their
populations. That would obviously open substantial tracts of land to
white farmers.
In adopting the values, dress, and vocations of white civilization,
however, the Indians also acquired some of the whites' vices. Foremost
among these evils was the abuse of alcohol, from which many of the
Indians' other problems stemmed. Violence occurred quite often among
drunken Indians and many traders used cheap whiskey as a means of getting
better deals from those who came to barter. The Indians consistently
lost in their struggles against unscrupulous whites. Because of this,
Isaac McCoy and others who shared his views campaigned for the establish-
ment of a permanent home for the Indians where they would be safe at
least until they could learn to cope with those who would take advantage
3
of them.
By about 1830 it became apparent to many officials that the two
cultures could not exist in close proximity. The only solution short of
the destruction of the Indians seemed to be removal beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the States and out of the way of settlers. President Jackson
himself stated that moving the tribes to the far west did "not place them
beyond the reach of philanthropic aid and Christian instruction." McCoy
also wanted to work for the Indians' "Christianization and civilization,"
24
and felt it had to be done far from the corruption of white traders
and pioneers. The Indians were not to be shipped out west and then
forgotten.
The huge reservations mapped out for the emigrating Indians in
the 1830s lay west of the Mississippi River as originally projected by
Thomas Jefferson, but by the time removal became a general policy
applicable to all of the eastern Indians, their new homes lay even
farther west, in the region popularly known as the Great American
Desert. One historian has recently pointed out, however, that although
the concept of the Great American Desert was recognized at the time,
officials did not intend to place the Indians on such inhospitable
lands
.
Even in the late 1820s, the area which later became the State of
Kansas was basically unmapped and unexplored. Thomas McKenney admitted
his ignorance on the type of land in the west, but urged that the lands
be examined for suitability before they were turned over to the Indians.
The land west of Missouri and Arkansas could obviously support the
roving bands who followed the buffalo herds, but the government sought
agricultural land for the emigrant tribes. McKenney encouraged
delegations of Indians to travel west and, within limits, choose the
g
lands to which they would move. Indians accompanied surveying expedi-
tions led by Isaac McCoy. The policy of allowing Indians to pick their
own lands convinced some of the tribes to pack their belongings and make
the journey west.
The encouragement of agriculture among the Indians involved more
than just giving them land and tools. The majority of the emigrants had
to be instructed in the use of the tools furnished, government officials
25
advocated the founding of schools to teach them. At the schools, the
Indians learned the advantages of farming and other domestic industries
over their former way of life. It was then possible, in theory, to
absorb them into the mainstream of American society. Though these
schools were founded as a rule by missionary groups, they did not thrive
until after the government furnished financial support.
Indian schools fell into two basic categories: academic, like
those which white children attended; and manual labor schools, geared
to the special needs of the Indians. The academic schools did not
have the desired effects on the Indians. Once educated in areas like
the basic sciences, the Indian youths seemed to lose touch with their
Indian heritage and often exhibited little enthusiasm for returning
to their tribes in order to teach others. Only a few Indian boys
could attend high schools and colleges, and so, the benefits of such
educations did not extend beyond those who actually attended the
schools.
Another problem with this type of Indian education was the expense
involved. In 1830, the Shawnees had the chance to send several of their
young men to a school in Kentucky for two hundred dollars each, but the
tribe felt it could not afford that much. They were, however, very
interested in establishing a school nearby, which had the advantages of
less cost, less distance, and a greater number of available students. 11
Missionaries built most of their schools in close proximity to the
tribal lands.
In meeting the government's goal of promoting agriculture among the
Indians, manual labor schools enjoyed more success and support than those
institutions which offered only the standard primary education. In a
26
manual labor school, the student received basic instruction in reading
and writing English, but he also learned how to "make fences; plough and
cultivate the fields;
. . . manufacture the requisite utensils; repair
his gun; and in short supply all his own wants , and exert a useful
12influence among his people."
Missionaries often opened their own little schools quite near the
tribes with whom they were working, but other concerned people preferred
larger, centrally located schools. They saw advantages in running
boarding schools where the students could not return home every day.
Without a long-term influence, the student might forget his education
after returning to his own, primitive, village life. At a larger school,
more students could be taught by a single instructor, increasing time- and
cost-effectiveness, and the students could be drawn from a greater number
of tribes. English would become the standard language because it would
1 3be the only language all of the students had to learn.
Missionary work began in the western Indian country in 1824 under
the United Foreign Missionary Society with the founding of the Mission
Neosho by the Reverend Benton Pixley. Several denominations built
missions in eastern Kansas, quite often with schools as part of their
operation. In addition to the Presbyterians, Methodists, Catholics, and
Baptists also worked on Christianizing the heathens. Of these groups,
Methodists and Baptists "dominated the religious life of the frontier."
Methodists had the support of a well-organized and powerful central body.
The Baptists, on the other hand, had no central authority. A man might
get the call to preach to the Indians, like Isaac McCoy, and devote his
life to it without ever enjoying major financial support.
McCoy worked most of his life for the improvement of the Indians.
27
He spent a great deal of time traveling between his missions on the
frontier and Washington, where he often met with political leaders. He
never seemed to have enough money to support his missionary efforts or
even his family. He summed up his efforts by stating:
My present business is one which has long been more
desireable [sic] notwithstanding it is so exceedingly
labourious and is accompanied by so many privations. I
have an opportunity of exerting influfence] on the main
subject of giving to all of the tribes a suitable home,
and on the measures necessary to be adopted for the improve-
ment of their condition subsequently. 1°
Another Baptist missionary and an acquaintance of Isaac McCoy was
Jotham Meeker. Meeker founded the Ottawa Baptist Mission in what is
today east-central Kansas in 1837. Several years later Meeker was
recognized by the Indian subagent in the area as being a "devoted
missionary, whose unwearied zeal for the present and future welfare of
18
the Ottawas has made them a truly industrious and moral people."
Missionaries like these took it upon themselves to educate and civilize
the Indians.
The Federal Government cooperated with the missionaries and supported
their work, but it also had its own guidelines to aid the Indians in
their new homes.* Briefly, the measures to be taken included the follow-
ing:
1
.
Protection of the Indian lands by the maintenance of
specific boundaries.
2. Prevention of the acquisition of Indian lands by anyone
other than the federal government.
3. Enforcement of the Indian trade laws.
*For a more detailed account of these guidelines as related by Secretary
of War Lewis Cass in 1831, see the appendix.
28
4. Interruption of the whiskey traffic into the Indian
country.
5. Provisions for the apprehension and trial of the members
of either race who commit crimes against the other.
6. Support for the programs and people dedicated to the
education and civilization of the red man.
I"
To a large extent, the army became the instrument for carrying out
these rules by functioning largely as a frontier police force. Part
of the military's actions stemmed from its assisting the Indian agents in
the area of any particular fort, but occasionally field commanders
received explicit orders on Indian matters from their superiors. Removing
squatters from the Indian country or Indians from white settlements were
both standard duties of the soldiers, but quite often the troops embarked
on major expeditions to impress the tribes and negotiate treaties. The
history of the permanent Indian frontier is, in some respects, a study of
Army-Indian relations.
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Chapter Three
Enforcing the Frontier
Indian peacekeeping duties occupied the United States Army for most
of its early years. Since the majority of the nation's soldiers
garrisoned widespread outposts, their assignments included exploring and
mapping new territories, and aiding Indian agents with such tasks as
disbursing annuities, regulating trade, and quelling disturbances. All
of these activities can be brought under the heading of safeguarding the
frontier. To the Indians, the army symbolized the United States.
Western defense posed difficult problems in the decade leading up to
the establishment of Fort Scott, Kansas in 1842. Because of the tradi-
tional opposition to a large standing army and a financial panic in the
late 1830s, Congress opposed any increase in military spending. Internal
and external events gave rise to the need for more appropriations,
though, and so the question of frontier defense generated widespread
political debate.
The removal of the various Indian tribes alone required a great deal
of expenditures, but the posts built and maintained to guard the boundary
also added to expenses. Arguments and documents projecting what was
really needed for the defense of the nation abounded. Two wars which
33
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stemmed from the Indians' resistance to removal, the Blackhawk War of
1832 and the Seminole War of the late 1830s and early 1840s, accented the
cries of those who demanded that more be spent on defense against the
savages. Given the reluctance of Congress, not everyone could be
satisfied. The Seminole War, instead of causing a substantial military
increase, forced a rearrangement of the forces then available. At a
time when eastern Indians were swelling the native population just to
the west of the organized states and territories, some frontier posts
were abandoned, and many of the troops were withdrawn and sent to
2
Florida.
Not everyone in the government agreed on the proper attitude to take
toward the Indians in the west. The native Plains Indians had to be
regarded as at least potentially dangerous. Treaties had been signed
only with the Kansa, Osage, and Pawnee tribes in the Kansas area, and
with the Sioux farther north. That left such nomadic tribes as the
Comanches and Cheyennes to do basically as they wished, which often meant
3preying on the displaced tribes who trespassed on their hunting grounds.
Many of the removal treaties, especially those with the southern
Indians, contained provisions which stated that the United States would
protect the tribes from hostile whites and other Indians. In addition,
the government furnished about 10,000 emigrant warriors with firearms to
4defend themselves. Yet some of these same Indians were suspected of
having "smothered feelings of hostilities ranking in their bosoms,"
because they had been sent west against their wills. Settlers in
Missouri and Arkansas demanded protection from the emigrants as well as
the native tribes.
The Indians, both those indigenous to the Plains and those placed
35
there, were not the only concern of those charged with defending the
nation's western boundaries. The conflict between Mexico and Texas over
the latter' s independence remained a problem for the United States until
finally settled in the Mexican-American War. The control of Oregon and
incidents with Canada cast doubt on the continuance of peaceful relations
with Great Britain. As a rule, however, when one discussed western
defense during the 1830s and early 1840s, debates centered on the
Indians.
The late 1830s saw major activity in stabilizing the permanent
Indian frontier. Several steps had to be taken. As Colonel Stephen
Watts Kearny, a frontier veteran, stated in 1837, "the preliminary
measures to protecting the frontier are to have the frontier definitely
settled." The next step was to survey and construct a road to connect
the posts already on the frontier, and the last necessary project
involved the building of additional "strong and permanent military works,
Q
garrisoned by infantry or artillery."
The frontier ran west of, and roughly parallel to, the Mississippi
River. The northernmost post was Fort Snelling near what is today St.
Paul, Minnesota. The frontier line ran south through Iowa, past Fort
Leavenworth, and then south along the western boundaries of Missouri and
Arkansas to Forts Gibson and Towson in present-day Oklahoma, with a
southern terminus at Fort Jesup in Louisiana. Those forts, and other
posts that were built and then abandoned, were constructed with an eye
"to their geographical advantages, and to the moral effect they were
9
calculated to have upon the Indians."
In examining possible post sites, selecting officers considered
defensible positions, available water, and transportation routes, rather
36
than the extension of a continuous string of forts which would mark a
rough line between Indian and white territory. The army built forts and
then abandoned them as the local situation seemed to dictate. This
caused confusion among the Indians in the vicinity of the deserted posts.
Some felt that they were being left unprotected by the government, while
other, hostile tribes believed that they had forced the soldiers to leave
through intimidation. By the late 1830s, the determining factors in
the location of a frontier post had changed to reflect the concept of the
permanent Indian frontier. The government decided additional military
strength was needed to maintain peaceful relations with and between
emigrants and the Plains tribes.
In his last message as president, Andrew Jackson recommended the
construction of additional forts in and along the Indian country. More
posts had become necessary because of the number of Indians being moved
into the area. Several years earlier, in 1834, a total of 35,000 Indians
had been placed there, which meant well over 8,000 potential warriors.*
About a thousand soldiers guarded the border between Forts Leavenworth
and Jesup at the time.
Military leaders argued that additional troops on the frontier would
reduce the chance that they would have to be used in combat. An effec-
tive buildup meant deploying the forces in a way to impress those Indians
12
which most needed to be shown the strength of the United States. Thus,
while any new posts were built with the larger picture of the entire
Indian frontier in mind, they still had to be near enough any likely
*The formula used in determining the approximate number of warriors was
one warrier for every four Indians in the tribe.
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trouble-spot to deter aggression and render aid to other forts if needed.
In the case of Fort Scott, it was built midway between Forts Gibson and
Leavenworth to fill the perceived gap in the defenses of the frontier.
Other determining factors in Fort Scott's location included the pleas
from Missouri residents for protection against the Osage Indians, and the
fact that the Fort Scott site had ample wood and water to supply such a
post.
Once Congress decided that additional installations were needed, the
debates on how many, how large, and where to place them began. Cost
remained a major factor throughout this period; the army could not
simply build all of the forts it desired. Colonel Zachary Taylor, later
President of the United States, favored temporary posts that could be
13
advanced as the Indians withdrew westward. ' This was somewhat prophetic
in seeing the end of the permanent Indian frontier, but most officials
in the late 1830s held to the concept and wanted permanent fortifica-
tions. One of the defense plans not adopted called for the establish-
ment of two lines of forts, a forward line in the Indian country, and a
second line well back for the refuge of settlers in the event of
Indian attack. Central storage depots and reserves were to be held
at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis, Missouri and at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
Another difference of opinion centered on the size of the forts and
garrisons needed to guard the permanent Indian frontier. General Winfield
Scott and Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup supported Colonel Kearny's
plan for the maintenance of a small number of relatively large posts.
These would cost less to build than a greater number of smaller sites and
improve the quality of training that the soldiers received. Kearny wanted
38
to drill the troops in larger units than the one or two companies that
had been standard up until that time, training which he considered
necessary for large expeditions onto the prairies. Campaigning time was
limited to the spring and early summer because the dragoons needed
sufficient forage for their mounts. Limiting the travel time needed to
rendezvous increased the period that could be spent in the field.
Secretary of War Jonathan Bell endorsed the plan for a greater number
of small frontier posts. In August, 1841 he wrote,
Of all the causes of future disturbances and war between
the Indians and the frontier inhabitants of the States, the
one most to be feared is a careless and inefficient civil
police. Small military posts, judiciously distributed upon
the boundary between the States and the Indian tribes, will
be of essential service in preventing causes of quarrel and
bloodshed; especially when employed as auxiliary to the law
and the civil magistrates. ^"
As usual in political debates, the net result for the frontier forts
was a compromise. Forts such as Leavenworth and Gibson remained rela-
tively large, and served as depots and regimental headquarters. Others,
Fort Scott among them, were designed for only squadrons or companies of
troops. Between 1833 and 1844, the army built fifteen forts and camps,
most of them along the permanent Indian frontier. Only a small number of
them lasted more than a few years before changes in Indian policy caused
their abandonment
.
Generally, forts built on the frontier during this period were
located on navigable rivers which made supply and communication lines
easier to keep open. Compromises had to be made, though. Beyond the
first tier of states west of the Mississippi there were few navigable
streams, so not all of the forts could be built on large rivers and still
meet the other guidelines for location. Some of the "navigable streams"
39
in the west could carry traffic only in the springtime floods. As a
result, the building of military roads connecting the forts became
18
necessary. The government authorized the construction of military
roads beginning in the late eighteenth century. With the institution of
the permanent Indian frontier, the north-south road which was eventually
built served not only as a route connecting the forts, but also as a
rough boundary line between the western states and the Indian country.
For this reason, Secretaries of War Lewis Cass (1831-1836) and Joel
Poinsett (1837-1841) both stressed that the road should be in the Indian
19territory and not within State boundaries. As long as the Indians
remained on their side of the military road, there would be no disputes
with State governments over jurisdiction of Indian conflicts.
Colonel Henry Dodge of the United States First Dragoons initially
expressed his recommendations for a road running from Fort Leavenworth
to Fort Gibson in January 1835. Over a year elapsed before Congress
finally authorized a surveying party to map the route and examine possible
20
sites for military posts.
Work on the survey and actual construction proceeded slowly. The
officers given responsibility for the survey, Colonel Kearny, Major T. E.
Smith, and Captain Nathan Boone, accomplished very little in 1837, but
21
completed the survey in 1838. Work commenced on the road and it was
completed in 1844. When finished, the military road linked the western
forts from Snelling on the northern Mississippi River to Towson where the
22Red River connected Fort Towson to Fort Jesup in Louisiana.
Construction of the road came to be a major occupation for the
frontier soldiers. The Engineer Corps of the army busied itself with the
construction of coastal fortifications and the Corps of Topographical
40
Engineers did not have the resources to oversee the construction, so the
duty often fell on the shoulders of the officers and enlisted men. In
the case of Fort Scott, however, the Army did use some craftsmen from
Missouri. The lack of both skilled labor and strong financial backing
determined the time at which the road could be completed. Trueman Cross,
Acting Quartermaster General in 1838, stated that western garrisons
lacked the men to gather their own firewood, let alone construct the
24
road. The situation remained basically unchanged until after the
Mexican-American War when Congress allowed troop increases.
Defense of the western frontier depended not only on the north-south
road and the posts established along the length of it, but also on the
troops stationed at the posts. Colonel Kearny recommended garrisons be
composed of artillery or infantry, but in addition to these troops,
soldiers were needed to patrol the prairies to make their presence known
to the Indians. The army needed a mounted branch of service to be
effective against the Plains tribes. Congress had abolished mounted
soldiers in 1821 in order to satisfy public protest against large
25
military budgets. " Dragoon and cavalry units were expensive to field
because of the cost of their equipment and mounts. By the time the
United States reached the prairies in the late 1820s, there was no
suitable alternative to a regular unit on horseback. In the view of
General Winfield Scott, for whom Fort Scott was named, "a warrior on
horseback looks upon foot-soldiers, beyond the limited range of muskets
26
without any sense of danger." Mounted volunteers could be used, but
they were limited to reaction, and not organized for preventative
measures against the Indians. That, in addition to the fact that their
41
short terms of service often ran out before the enemy could be engaged,
made their use undesirable.
In 1832, Congress enacted a short-term measure designed to meet the
problem of defense on the Plains. A regiment of mounted rangers were
recruited for western service, but these troops did not work out as well
as envisioned for several reasons. Their enlistment ran for only one
year and they had to furnish their own mounts and equipment, for which
27
they were compensated. That resulted in a tremendous variety in dress
and armament. A year later Congress authorized the regiment of United
States Dragoons.
The dragoons performed a vital role in dealing with the Plains
Indians. Besides being able to pursue marauding Indians if the need
arose, they could patrol with greater ease and speed, making them more
visible to more Indians. Another important element of the dragoons was
their uniforms. Sometimes bedraggled after a long summer of crossing
the Plains, dragoons could still stage quite a display at treaty-signing
28
ceremonies and similar occasions when in dress uniforms.
The organization of the United States Dragoons in 1833, soon
followed by the 2nd Dragoons, and the construction of the military road
from Fort Snelling to Fort Towson, brought the enforcement of the
permanent Indian frontier within reach. By 1838 when construction of
the road began, it seemed as if the Indians would, indeed, have their
permanent home where they could learn the ways of civilization. The
frontier still contained many gaps which had to be filled in order to
stop the whiskey trade and illegal trespassers from both sides of the
line. Fort Scott was one of the forts constructed for this purpose.
42
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Chapter Four
The Role of Fort Scott
The first construction at the post that became Fort Scott began on
April 9, 1842 and the site officially received its garrison at the end of
May. The history of Fort Scott actually began years before. The first
surveys for the military road mentioned the Marmaton River as a possible
location for a fort. The location midway between Forts Leavenworth and
Gibson meant troops on the Marmaton could fill the gap in the line of
installations along the permanent Indian frontier and help to enforce the
laws designed to protect both the farmers of Missouri and area Indians.
Although Fort Scott was not built until years after the passage of the
removal and intercourse legislation, construction began as soon as
military plans and resources allowed. This early period of Fort Scott's
history revolved around its functions as an outpost on the border of the
Indian country.
The first garrison at Fort Scott came from Fort Wayne in the
Cherokee Nation in present-day northeastern Oklahoma. In 1837, Colonel
Zachary Taylor ordered the members of the commission surveying the route
for the north-south military road to note possible sites for the
establishment of a post to replace Fort Wayne, which the Cherokees
47
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disliked having on their land. The Marmaton site was considered even
before Fort Wayne was built in 1839, but the army did not have the funds
or manpower to place forts at both locations. Fort Scott, therefore, was
not built until after Fort Wayne had been abandoned. Despite the desire
for a garrison where Fort Scott was eventually built and the complaints
from a delegation of Cherokees in 1841, the order to evacuate Wayne and
occupy a new site was not issued until February 10, 1842 after Major
2
Ethan Allen Hitchcock recommended construction of a new post.
When officers surveyed the Indian frontier and reported on the need
for posts, they made their recommendations based on their training and
experience. Congress then decided what was needed for defense and the
amount that could be spent. In the case of Fort Scott, two forts were
earlier recommended for the area. Fort Scott was built as a compromise
between the two sites suggested, one where the military road crossed
the Marais des Cygne, and the other about eighty miles farther south on
3
the Spring River.
General Winfield Scott, for whom the fort was named, opposed the
proliferation of forts along the Indian border. He felt some posts were
obviously necessary. However, because he was the Major General of the
Army—the highest-ranking officer—he probably felt more congressional
pressure to be economical than the officers who advocated a greater
4
number of small forts. Citizens of Missouri also requested that
additional forts be built. In 1843 a memorial from the General Assembly
of Missouri asked for the establishment of another post between Forts
Scott and Leavenworth, but it was never built and probably never
seriously considered by the Army.
The construction of Fort Scott began in the spring of 1842 near
49
where the road crossed the Marmaton River. The site was a few miles west
of the Missouri State line on land that had been reserved for various
small tribes of New York Indians . Few of them ever emigrated to the
area, so the Army did not have to concern itself with establishing its
right to the grounds.
The completion of Fort Scott took several years. The lack of
skilled laborers in the vicinity contributed to the slow pace, but the
military duties of the garrison also hampered efforts to complete the
fort. These actions consisted of aiding the Indian agents and subagents
near the fort in carrying out the provisions of the Intercourse Act of
1834 and preventing inter-tribal conflicts.
Potential for warfare existed within the Indian lands. Many differ-
ent tribes lived reasonably close together; among those were some that
continued their traditional animosity toward their neighbors. The Sioux
from the northern plains devoted much of their energies to fighting the
Potawatomies and Pawnees. The Pawnees in turn regularly attacked the
Osage and Kansa Indians.
The hostilities among the native Plains tribes were a traditional
part of that culture but a threat to peace on the frontier. Although
the government disapproved and attempted to prevent such conflicts,
struggles between the indigenous tribes and the emigrants were an even
greater danger to the existence of the permanent Indian frontier by
threatening to spread all along the border. As early as 1817 warfare
between the Osages and emigrant Cherokees brought the United States Army
into eastern Oklahoma. A treaty signed with the Cherokee Nation in 1817
obtained the right for the United States to build a fort in the area to
o
help keep peace between the tribes.
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Many of the war-parties actually began as hunting-parties only to
change their purpose after being disappointed in the pursuit of game.
The emigrants, even those accustomed to raising their own crops and
livestock, often preferred to hunt the buffalo and antelope of the
Plains. With this additional pressure, the herds shrank rapidly and
increasing numbers of hunters returned home unsuccessful. This problem
also caused the Indians to seek new hunting grounds at the expense of
other tribes' traditional lands, despite the creation of "neutral"
9grounds and outlets to the open prairie.
Many of the emigrants adopted the trappings of civilization in
dress, religion, and values, yet when confronted with the hostile tribes
of the Plains, the emigrants had a tendency to revert to the old ways.
When disappointed hunters preyed on the livestock of the newcomers,
violent retaliation often resulted. The forts built by the United
States Army kept the peace between all of the tribes more than they
protected the emigrants against the native tribes because the emigrants
generally stood up to attack better than their enemies. Not only were
the emigrants better-armed as a rule, they had been in contact with the
white man longer and had learned from that experience.
Fort Scott, like most frontier posts, did not see any major Indian
12battles during its existence. The tribes located in that part of
Kansas were not as fierce in the 1840s as they had once been. Only the
Osages were native to the area, and by the time of Fort Scott's occupa-
tion, the tribe suffered from widespread abuse of alcohol. The mere
presence of the fort probably helped to keep the Indians peaceful and
the violence that did occur was not warfare, but isolated incidents.
The forts on the permanent Indian frontier did more than maintain
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order among the tribes. The army also had to protect the states and
people just to the east of the boundary. Appeals from Missouri contrib-
uted the most to the building of Fort Scott, because Congress had to
listen to concerned voters in the frontier states, a crucial area of
support in the sectional battles that loomed.
The annual reports of the Indian agents in the field make up many of
the records from this period. They generally echoed each other, stating
how well the Indians were doing in their progression to civilization,
while at the same time lamenting the abuse of alcohol and the prevalence
of old habits and customs. In 1845, the Osages were reported to be "as
comfortable as their manner of life and indolent dispositions will allow.
They have also been generally healthy, although many cases of consumption
13have taken place among them— . . . ." Soon after assuming his duties
as the Neosho subagent in 1845, James S. Raines wrote:
from a thorough examination of the former reports made
in relation to these Indians, I find that the greatest
improvements are spoken of every year—so much so that,
if you could possibly believe that these Indians really
have made such rapid strides on the road towards civiliza-
tion, education, agriculture, and industry of every kind,
as has been reported, you might correctly imagine them
to be at least up side by side, if not ahead of the most
civilized, wisest, moral, industrious, wealthy, and
enterprising people on earth . "
Some of the Indians did seem to make genuine progress, though. In
1846, the Peorias and Kaskaskias raised "exceedingly promising crops of
corn," enough to get them through that winter safely. Two factors stood
out that contributed to the successes they achieved: the two tribes
adhered to the Roman Catholic Church, and no longer received government
annuities. ' The fact these tribes' annuities had expired forced them t
raise their own food or suffer from hunger. Still, their adaptation
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spoke well of their determination to survive at a time when many Indians
perished.
The influence of churches in really helping the Indians is difficult
to trace. Despite the apparent sincerity of many of the Indians,
progress remained sporadic. Records from the Delaware Baptist Mission
from 1841 detailed the case of one Indian, Jonas Konkaput. He was
suspended from communion and other church activities for drunkenness, but
after he repented, the church "unanimously agreed" to allow him back.
Konkaput was again "overcome by intemperance" and barred from the church,
to be readmitted only after the church was convinced that his repentance
would last longer. Konkaput, like so many other Indians, simply could
not resist the lure of easily-obtained alcohol.
Cultural habits and poor health added to the Indians' problems in
their Kansas homes. Many of the tribesmen saw agriculture and other
types of labor demeaning, fit only for women. The diets of both the
emigrant and Plains Indians directly affected their health. Hunting
became a matter of chance as more tribes crowded into the area, and few
of the Indians had fully made the transition to agriculture, so the
Indians often suffered from hunger. This, coupled with the lack of
18
medical attention, caused a higher mortality rate than necessary.
The greatest problems which faced the Indians stemmed from the abuse
of alcohol. While the Intercourse Act of 1834 sought to keep all alcohol
out of the Indian country, the trade continued unabated. Few of the
Indians could resist the temptation, especially since whiskey was sold in
so many places along the border. In 1841, the Osage subagent wrote that
alcohol could be bought from "almost every other house" along the Missouri
U A 19border.
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The disbursal system for the annuities also contributed to the
alcohol problem among the Indians. Traders willingly extended generous
lines of credit to the Indians during the year and sold them goods at
prices which justified the risk of not being paid. When the annuities
were paid, the traders made claims on much of the money for the
accumulated debts. Whatever money remained quickly went to the whiskey
20
dealers who set up shop near the disbursal area. With their resources
expended, the Indians were then forced to renew the cycle.
Robert Calloway, the subagent for the Osages in 1842, attempted to
remedy some of the problems in the system. Instead of paying the
annuities to the chiefs of the tribe, Calloway through great efforts,
managed to pay the heads of families, increasing the odds that the money
would be distributed fairly throughout the tribe. He also made sure he
was present as the money changed hands to ensure that provisions and
21
other needed goods were purchased rather than illegal whiskey. In his
own words, Calloway was "infamous" for his efforts to stop the detrimental
22
trade with the Indians.
Despite Calloway's efforts, the Osages continued to get the whiskey
they desired. The tribe had received two hundred cows and calves and
four hundred hogs as part of the government's program to encourage
farming, but the Indians traded the stock for provisions and liquor prior
to their annual hunt on the prairie. Those who stayed home from the hunt
traded everything they could for whiskey, and were then forced to steal or
beg in order to eat. Calloway complained that Fort Scott dragoons, who
could have been patrolling the border and intercepting at least some of
the alcohol, had been sent instead on a Plains expedition. He also
stated the border needed many more dragoons to effectively curb the
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liquor traffic because of the numbers and skill of the traders who
23
engaged in the trade.
Intoxication resulted in violence. One agent reported in his
region, "more than half the adults who die, perish by the hands of their
fellow- Indians. Frequently members of the same family destroyed each other
24during their scenes of drunkenness and riot."
The soldiers of Fort Scott helped to keep the area peaceful by
returning both Indians and whites to their respective sides of the Indian
frontier line. In October 1842 and again in 1844, dragoon detachments
rode into Missouri to force Indians to return to their Kansas homes. In
September 1844, five infantrymen from the fort evicted John'Mathews from
a house he had built on the Osage reservation. Troops also accompanied
some missionaries on their journeys, but as guides rather than as
guards.
Detachments from Fort Scott's garrison participated in major
expeditions on the prairies several times. During the summer of 1843,
Fort Scott dragoons escorted Santa Fe traders west. At one point the
soldiers encountered a band of about one hundred Indians from Texas and
disarmed them, preventing the Indians from further raiding. The follow-
ing summer a similar dragoon expedition marched and explored as far as
Wyoming. The exploits of the dragoons, in addition to the immediate
results accomplished, helped in preventing Indian wars by impressing the
tribes with the power and proximity of the United States Army.
Like other frontier posts, Fort Scott lent its troops to the task
of peacekeeping. No major Indian battles took place in the vicinity of
Fort Scott while the Army occupied the post, but it is difficult to say
whether this was due to the deterrent effect of Fort Scott itself, to the
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temperament of the Indians, or to the debilitating effects of widespread
alcohol abuse. Far removed from the main emigrant routes and battle-
fields, Fort Scott nevertheless contributed to the defense of the
permanent Indian frontier.
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Chapter Five
The End of the Experiment
Following the close of the Mexican War in 1848, the policy of
keeping the region of present-day Kansas and Nebraska as a permanent home
for the eastern Indians quietly faded away. It did not happen quickly.
It built upon ideas that had existed since at least the early 1840s, the
time at which the permanent Indian frontier drawn west of the line of
forts built to preserve it. By 1854, the permanent boundary line had
officially disappeared.
The reasons behind the demise of the permanent Indian frontier can
be placed into three broad categories:
1. American expansion into the far west in the 1840s and
the trails and projected railroad routes needed to get
there. This brought Manifest Destiny into play with
American sovereignty over Oregon, Texas, California, and
the Southwest.
2. Expansion of white settlement onto the plains west
of Arkansas, Missouri and Iowa, closely linked to the
question of slavery in any new states or territories
formed.
3. Concern for the condition of the Indians themselves.
It is convenient that concern for the Indians translated
into more land for white farmers , but the widespread
destitution of the tribes did make some sort of action
on their behalf necessary.
The trails heading west caused the first conflicts with the concept
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of the permanent Indian frontier. The earliest of these, the Santa Fe
Trail, was used since 1821. A survey of this route was conducted and
the right of transit obtained from the Indians following an Act of
2
Congress in 1825. The first traders on this route wielded influence
with people such as Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri. With his
aid, they helped to establish Fort Leavenworth at its present site on
the Missouri River. Fort Leavenworth had the best location to begin the
patrols for the protection of trade caravans during the initial stage of
3
their journeys from Independence, Missouri. Within a few years of using
the Santa Fe Trail, the traders gained needed experience in dealing with
the Plains Indians safely, but because of the difficulties that developed
between Texas and Mexico, dragoons began escorting the pack trains
across the prairie.
The Oregon Trail developed somewhat later than the trade route to
Santa Fe, but the ultimate impact it had on Indian policy was greater.
The people who migrated to Oregon did so to settle the region, not trade
like the majority of those who used the Santa Fe Trail. The first American
pioneers went to the Pacific Northwest in 1834. Their numbers gradually
increased but in 1843, the year of the "Great Migration," there were still
only about 800 people who made the journey to the Oregon country.
The Oregon question serves as an excellent representation of the
entire "Manifest Destiny" phenomenon in United States history. The area
known as Oregon included the present states of Oregon, Idaho, Washington
as well as the province of British Columbia. The United States had
shared a claim to the region with Great Britain, but by 1844, the concept
of Manifest Destiny prompted many people to demand that the United States
take sole possession of the area. In order to make a good case for
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United States' sovereignty, the region needed to be settled by American
citizens. With that in mind, expansionists encouraged the movement of
settlers to Oregon.
Unpredictable Indians along the route remained the primary fear of
those who contemplated moving to Oregon in the 1840s. Secretary of War
John C. Spencer acknowledged this in his annual report for 1842. The
United States needed an "exhibition of military power" in the area and on
the route not only to keep the Indians subdued, but also, he said, to
counteract "the unresisted influences of the traders and emissaries of
foreign nations" among the Indians.
In 1842, however, posts like Fort Scott were still being built to
mark and enforce the permanent Indian frontier well outside the area
influenced by migration to Oregon, and Congress was not forthcoming with
additional funds to establish a line of forts on the western trails. Yet
in late 1845, requests to Congress still urged the building of posts "to
maintain our rights to Oregon." These forts would not only protect those
already emigrating, but encourage many others to do so by protecting the
travelers and focusing attention on the region.
The Army soon established posts such as Fort Kearny and Fort
Laramie on the western trails, but the Mexican War interrupted the
building program. Another measure was the formation of the Regiment of
Mounted Riflemen authorized in May 1846 expressly for duty on the Oregon
Trail. Instead of heading for the Northwest, however, the soldiers went
south to fight Mexico. Only in 1849, after the men's enlistments had
run out and they were again recruited, did the regiment set out from
Fort Leavenworth for their assignment along the Platte River.
The Army expanded as a result of the war with Mexico, as had the
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nation itself with the settlement of the Oregon dispute, the annexation
of Texas, and the acquisition of the vast Mexican cession in the
Southwest. Despite the increase of the army, there were too few soldiers
to guard the new territories and continue the occupation of the forts
along the permanent Indian frontier. As a result, the army reduced the
garrisons at Fort Scott and similar posts, and sent the troops west. The
emigrant Indians in Kansas, despite their drunken sprees and other
problems, were not prone to open warfare as the tribes of the far west
were in the 1850s. When it came to a choice of soldiers for one
line of posts or the other, the forts on the permanent Indian frontier
generally lost their garrisons.
Settlers and traders moving through Indian country definitely
affected the change in policy in the 1850s, but the overflow of white
farmers from the States just to the east of the Indian lands had as great
an effect.
The history of Indian-white relations generally followed the same
course. It started with the establishment of Indian lands guaranteed by
treaty. These were usually maintained for several years before
"squatters" would move on to a parcel of land and begin making improve-
ments and planting crops. Officially, once these farmers were discovered
living in Indian country, they were asked, and if necessary, forced to
leave. The army lacked sufficient troops to patrol all Indian lands
adequately, so many of the illegal settlers remained undiscovered. Even
if the army did find and remove them, the squatters often returned as
soon as the soldiers left the vicinity. Once enough of these people
occupied a given area, they could petition the government to change the
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boundaries of the Indian holdings and allow them to keep the farms that
they had created illegally.
In 1841, because of the migration of whites, Isaac McCoy expressed
his concern for the integrity of the permanent Indian frontier:
[I had] recently been deeply impressed with the considera-
tion of the fact that the overwhelming [illegible] of
imigration to the west for years past, has reached the
western line of the States of Arkansas and Missouri. It
is now turning on itself and thickening, and in the north
of Missouri the wooded country . . . will be comparatively
filled. If this should happen before the Indians within
the Indian Territory be secured in their possessions, a
disasterous rush will be made upon them [sic].°
The illegal appropriation of Indian lands by frontiersmen contributed
to the removal policy in the first place, and by 1850, it appeared such
actions would cause a further change in the course of United States-Indian
relations.
Following the Mexican War and the addition of the vast western
territories, sectionalism gained force as an issue. The problem of
squatters in the Indian country became more urgent to both sides of the
slavery question. In his 1841 journal, Isaac McCoy commented on
slavery's influence on the Indian frontier, but it remained a relatively
minor issue until after the Mexican War when the Indians were surrounded
by organized States and Territories.
The permanent Indian frontier, it can be argued, ended in practice
when the Army stopped removing squatters from Indian lands in the early
1850s, but the official end of the policy came with the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. The Army abandoned Fort Scott and sold
the buildings in 1853, a time by which it appeared inevitable that Kansas
would be opened to white settlement.
Although title to the Indian lands had not been extinguished, the
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1854 Act provided territorial governments for Kansas and Nebraska. The
opening of the new Territories hinged on two primary issues: slavery and
transcontinental railroad routes.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act provided for the settlement of the slavery
question by the people living in the new territories when they applied for
statehood. Those who had been living in Indian territory were allowed
to remain and many new settlers joined. Politicians from North and South
tried to get those with views similar to their own to move to the new
Territories, especially Kansas, in order to preserve the free state-
slave state balance in the Senate. Many Northerners opposed the move,
fearing an extension of slavery, but others, such as former Secretary of
War and Democratic candidate for President in 1848 Lewis Cass, joined
Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois in the belief that the future
12
states would reject slavery.
With the acquisition of the Pacific coast, the dreams of a
transcontinental railroad moved closer to reality. From 1850 to 1854,
the amount of railroad tracks in the United States increased from 8600
13to 21,300 miles and routes for further expansion westward were sought.
A southern route through Texas and New Mexico would have left the Indian
territory undisturbed, but the Northern and Central states opposed it.
Southerners blocked a northern route because it would have opened more
land to free state settlers. The central route, which opened Kansas and
Nebraska, left the new Territories open to settlement from both North
and South and gave roughly equal access to the railroads to both sections
of the country.
The additional territories acquired by the United States in the
1840s, the squatters on Indian lands, the railroad routes, and the
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sectional differences tied in with all of them can be brought under the
heading of land-hunger or greed on the part of the government or at least
individuals within the government. As in the formation of the removal
policy and the permanent Indian frontier, concern for the survival of the
Indians also figured in the major changes in policy in the 1850s. By the
late 1840s, the key to the preservation of the Indians (as individuals,
not as distinct cultural groups) was no longer removal, but concentration.
The problem of civilizing the Indians had lost much of its appeal by the
end of the Mexican War. In the documents of that time more space was
devoted to the reasons for and planning to get the tribes out of the way
so more whites could move west than is spent on the issue of saving the
Indians. Concentration of the Indians would accomplish this by grouping
the tribes into two major areas: the present-day states of North and
South Dakota, and Oklahoma. Between these two regions lay the routes
west, along with a vast amount of land which could be opened to the
citizens of the United States.
Instruction in agriculture and religion, it was argued, could be
carried out with greater efficiency after concentration. Superintendent
of Indian Affairs at St. Louis, Thomas H. Harvey, declared:
The more closely the different tribes are brought in
proximity to each other, the more efficient may be made
the superintendence of the government, and the more the
expenses of such superintendence be diminished. . . .
I have observed that those neighborhoods that are most
thickly settled, (provided they be not in villages,)
advance more rapidly in general improvements than scattered
settlements. **
In addition to making the education of Indians easier and more
efficient, concentration would also increase their safety from attack
from hostile tribes or their white neighbors. Smaller tribes, decimated
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or diminished by disease and through alcohol-related violence, held an
amount of land greater than their relative numbers. This land was
declared useless to them because game was scarce which made the land "a
positive disadvantage to them." The annuities paid as compensation for
earlier land cessions had expired for some of the tribes and their transi-
tion to the agrarian life was far from complete. With the depletion of
game many of the Indians faced hunger and even starvation. With further
land cessions, the annuities could be renewed and the instruction in
farming continued under better conditions.
Indian land cessions or exchanges had never really ceased, even
after the Indians reached their "permanent" homes. The Missouri-Indian
border was stable for awhile, but to the north and south of Missouri
whites still pushed the Indians westward. In 1846, the Winnebagos,
accepted a treaty in which they gave up the last of their Iowa lands,
totaling several million acres. They were the last tribe in Iowa. Legal
white settlement began on this land and not only was Iowa freed "from a
fruitful source of annoyance," but also the Indians were removed "from
the bad influences incident to their proximity to a white population."
By this time, the American Indian Mission Association feared for
the integrity of the Indian country. An effort to revise the removal
policy gained more attention and officials spoke less of the permanent
Indian frontier than they had in the 1830s. Those who considered them-
selves friends of the Indians felt "distrust and alarm" at the prospects
of abrogating the treaties which guaranteed the Indians their permanent
homes
.
The tide had turned against the Indian frontier concept. Between
1846 and 1854, the public debate on the subject centered not on the
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question of whether or not the policy would be changed, but rather how it
would be changed. Plans for organizing Nebraska and Kansas as Territories
were formed before the Mexican War, but it was not until the 1854 Act
that the sectional differences could be reconciled. As the day of white
settlement of the region approached, negotiations with the Indians for
yet more removals continued.
The government concluded more than fifty treaties with the Plains
18
Indians between 1851 and 1856. The boundaries for the respective
tribes changed in an effort to accommodate all of them into a much smaller
area. The central Plains of Kansas and Nebraska were largely cleared of
Indians, and the bulk of the tribes moved either north to the future
States of the Dakotas or south to Oklahoma. The idea of permanency for
the Indian country was no longer accepted. The tribes that remained in
Kansas after it became an organized Territory held only a remnant of
their former lands. The experiment of keeping the Indians outside of the
organized States and territories until they could lead civilized lives
had failed. Even in the first few years of Fort Scott's existence,
policy changes were being discussed which would change not only the
frontier line, but the entire concept of the frontier.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
The history of the permanent Indian frontier and its relationship to
Fort Scott can be divided into two distinct areas of examination: theory
and practice. Great differences between the two became apparent in the
years 1830-1854.
According to the way in which the concept was laid out, the Indians
would accept removal beyond the Mississippi because it gave them a great
deal of good land in exchange for the lands that they held east of the
Mississippi. Quite often the game on which the Indians depended had
been killed or driven off their lands , and the Indians always had to
contend with the nearby settlers in their original lands. Generally
collisions between the white and red men were on an individual basis, but
occasionally, as in the case of the Cherokee Nation and the State of
Georgia, the differences extended far beyond individuals.
The United States government failed to take into consideration what
the Indians themselves desired. Many of the tribes moved willingly,
abandoning their already reduced homelands in favor of western lands and
plentiful game. Others, like the Cherokees, had already adopted an
agricultural way of life and had a deep affection for their ancestral
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homes. They did not wish to be uprooted regardless of how favorable an
exchange they could get. President Andrew Jackson and the majority in
Congress arbitrarily determined that the Cherokees and virtually all of
the eastern Indians would, indeed, move and accordingly forced them out.
For the Cherokees, this resulted in their "Trail of Tears."
The standard assumption of those who supported removal for the good
of the Indians was they should adopt the manners and vocations of western
civilization. That meant giving up the hunt and learning to manage small
farms. Behind the protection of the permanent Indian frontier, the
Indians were to change their ways gradually by seeing the advantages of
raising crops and livestock through demonstration. "Permanent" actually
meant indefinite, but on a long-term basis. This might conceivably have
worked if the frontier could have been maintained as long as originally
planned. However, changes came quickly in national perceptions and goals,
and officials who had been sympathetic to the difficulties facing the
Indians were replaced by those who had more concern for the greatness of
the nation and the frontiersmen who continued to press the Indians.
In 1830, when the permanent Indian frontier became the goal of the
government, and in 1834, when the Intercourse Act spelled out rules for
the segregation of the Indians, the Indian country was actually colonial
territory from the Louisiana Purchase and outside the organized United
States. Though the area undisputedly belonged to the nation, it had no
government except the one in Washington, D.C. Despite the discussions
of a future Indian state, the natives never gained territorial status
for their lands, and the Indian frontier was considered the western
frontier of the country.
The Oregon and Santa Fe Trails, cutting through the heart of Indian
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land became sources of difficulties, but the conflicts which arose were
by no means insurmountable. By the early 1840s, expansionists became
more vocal and demanded the annexation of the Republic of Texas as well
as sole control of the Oregon Country. These cries gained power as more
and more Americans filled Texas and the Northwest. By 1848, the United
States gained control not only of Texas and much of Oregon, but also of
the Southwest. The Indians found themselves surrounded by lands open to
white settlement the primary routes to which traversed the middle of the
Indian land in Kansas and Nebraska.
With the dramatic increase in national power and prestige which
resulted from this land acquisition, concern for the Indians receded.
The nation devoted time, energy, and money to taming the new lands. That
often meant fighting Indians rather than civilizing them. The limited
resources of the Army went to Texas and the new West instead of the
internal border on the edge of the Plains.
The early history of Fort Scott reflected these changes in policy of
the 1840s and the 1850s. Built in 1842 expressly to guard the Missouri
border against the intrusion of the Osages and other tribes and to stem
the flow of liquor into the Indians' hands, Fort Scott actually existed
past its most useful period. The order to abandon Fort Scott was
carried out in 1853, a year before Kansas became a Territory, but even
earlier than this there were few who doubted that the region would be
opened to white settlement. The troops who occupied Fort Scott moved
west to pacify other tribes and to patrol the migration routes.
As the Indians migrated out of Kansas and Nebraska, their former
"permanent" homes, white settlers moved in. Relocation in the Dakotas
or Oklahoma was no longer considered permanent for the tribes. It was
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only a matter of time before the individual allotment of land to each
Indian would result in smaller reservations, and the land taken away
opened for whites.
The experiment in Indian relations failed, not because the govern-
ment did not care about the Indians, but because of a rapidly growing
population and frontiersmen who occupied whatever land they wanted,
disregarding rightful ownership. Given the reluctance of Congress to
authorize sufficient military budgets in the period 1830 to 1845, complete
enforcement of the permanent Indian frontier became impossible. Too much
land had to be patrolled by an inadequate number of troops.
After the Mexican War, the problem changed. The lack of money
became secondary to the lack of will to enforce the laws dealing with
Indian relations. The emphasis shifted to expansion and exploitation of
the new regions rather than the care and education of the Indians. The
goals which officials and other concerned citizens hoped to reach with
the Indians in the 1830s could not stand up to the pocketbook issues of
the expansionists in the 1840s.
Appendix
This is an excerpt from the Annual Report of the Secretary of War
for 1831. These are the guidelines which Secretary Lewis Cass urged the
government to follow in dealing with the Indians. It should be noted
that before being appointed Secretary of War, Cass was governor of
Michigan Territory. He was considered to be very knowledgeable about
Indian affairs and a friend of the Indians.
The general details of a plan for the permanent establishment of
the Indians west of the Mississippi, and for their proper security, would
require much deliberation; but there are some fundamental principles,
obviously arising out of the nature of the subject, which, when once
adopted, would constitute the best foundation for our exertions, and the
hopes of the Indians.
1. A solemn declaration, similar to that already inserted in some
of the treaties, that the country assigned to the Indians shall be
theirs as long as they or their descendants may occupy it, and a
corresponding determination that our settlements shall not spread over
it; and every effort should be used to satisfy the Indians of our
superiority and of their security. Without this indispensable pre-
liminary, and without full confidence on their part in our intentions,
and in our abilities to give these effect, their change of position
would bring no change of circumstances.
2. A determination to exclude all ardent spirits from their new
country. This will no doubt be difficult; but a system of surveillance
upon the borders, and of proper police and penalties, will do much
towards the externalization of an evil, which, where it exists in any
considerable extent, is equally destructive of their present comfort
and future happiness.
3. The employment of an adequate force in their immediate vicinity,
and a fixed determination to suppress, at all hazards, the slightest
attempt at hostilities among themselves.
So long as a passion for war, fostered and encouraged, as it is, by
their opinions and habits, is allowed free scope for exercise, it will
prove the master spirit, controlling, if not absorbing, all other
considerations. And if in checking this evil some examples should
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become necessary, they would be sacrifices to humanity, and not to
severity.
4. Encouragement to the severalty of property, and such provisions
for its security, as their own regulations do not afford, and as may be
necessary to its enjoyment.
5. Assistance to all who may require it in the opening of farms,
and in procuring domestic animals and instruments of agriculture.
6. Leaving them in the enjoyment of their peculiar institutions,
as far as may be compatible with their own safety and ours, and with the
great objects of their prosperity and improvements.
7. The eventual employment of persons competent to instruct them,
as far and as fast as their progress may require, and in such manner as
may be most useful to them.
*
^Annual Report of the Secretary of War
, Dec. 6, 1831, 22nd Cong., 1st
sess., H. Doc. 2, serial 216, 33-34.
A Note on Sources
The congressional serials, including the Annual Reports of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Secretary of War have proven to be
the most useful sources on the permanent Indian frontier in general.
The serials contain many reports from committees, and memorials relating
to Indian affairs from state legislatures and missionary groups. The
Annual Reports , consistently divided into subsections, relate the changes
which occurred from year to year. The main drawback to these sources is
that there is little material dealing explicitly with Fort Scott.
The Kansas State Historical Society has been a much better source
of Fort Scott information. In addition to the collections of men such
as Isaac McCoy and Robert Simerwell, the Society holds Fort Scott and
Bourbon County histories.
Francis Paul Prucha is the best secondary source of information. He
has written extensively on Indian policy and his work, American Indian
Policy in the Formative Years is the best book I have found on Indian
affairs from American independence through the Intercourse Act of 1834.
Prucha' s A Bibliographical Guide to the History of Indian-White Relations
in the United States has also been very helpful in finding additional
sources.
The main problem in researching Fort Scott during this period is the
lack of primary material dealing with the post. Government sources touch
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upon the post briefly, but generally deal with the larger issues. Local
histories, generally written from personal reminiscences, are often
unreliable and are not, as a rule, well-documented. Though there are
sources dealing with how the fort was built and how much it cost, there
is little on the actions of the soldiers in the 1840s.
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